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In arguments made about the paradoxes of Zeno of Elea there is not always a clear 
distinction between attempts to determine what Zeno was originally trying to argue 
and how Zeno’s arguments have influenced, or been used in, modern mathematics. 
In this Dissertation it is argued that if one is interested in determining the original 
purpose of Zeno’s arguments, then it is not helpful to either express the paradoxes as 
modern mathematical problems or pose modern mathematical solutions to them. 
Doing either of these things will adversely effect the way in which Zeno’s paradoxes 
can be interpreted. To the extent that Zeno’s paradoxes are discussed in modern 
mathematics they are usually used merely as analogies, where the question of what 
Zeno was originally trying to argue is largely irrelevant. This is not to say that 
modern mathematical argument about Zeno should not be discussed, simply that they
are a different set of arguments. If one is trying to determine Zeno’s original 
argument then one should focus instead on analysing the arguments made against 
Zeno by other ancient thinkers. Ancient thinkers are likely to have had a far better 
understanding of Zeno’s original argument simply because they are historically 
closer to him.
This dissertation discusses two articles in which this issue arises. In neither article is 
it claimed that Zeno’s paradoxes were simple statements of mathematical fallacy. 
However, both authors insist on comparing the arguments which Zeno and his 
ancient opponent appear to make, with modern mathematical arguments. This 
obscures certain ways of interpreting Zeno’s paradoxes. An interpretation of Zeno’s 
argument, which is likely to be overlooked if a modern approach to Zeno is taken, 
will be discussed in this dissertation.
A mathematical approach to Zeno can obscure the possibility that Zeno might have 
been more interested in the question of how it is possible that an extension can have 
the infinite number of extended parts which it appears to have. A mathematical 
approach to Zeno tends to focus more on infinite summation and infinite amounts in 
a purely abstract and non-physical sense.
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Zeno’s paradoxes are a set of arguments posed by Zeno of Elea in the fifth century 
BCE. The paradoxes, to the extent which we know them, describe various assertions 
about the physical world which appear to be true but, according to Zeno, lead to 
absurd conclusions. 
I will primarily be discussing Zeno’s Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes. Both these 
paradoxes involve a runner attempting to run a finite distance. It would seem these 
runners should be able to complete their respective runs, however according to Zeno 
they cannot. I will elaborate on the details of these paradoxes later.
 
Because we have access to little, if any, of Zeno’s original arguments it is difficult to 
determine what Zeno was really trying to argue.  It is this question of what was Zeno 
trying to argue which I am interested in in this paper.
In my research of this topic, however, I encountered a particular problem. Zeno’s 
paradoxes are also used in various modern mathematical arguments. The issue is that
there is not always a clear distinction made between how Zeno’s paradoxes have 
been used by modern mathematicians and the task of trying to determine what Zeno 
was originally trying to argue.
In this paper I will argue that assuming a modern mathematical perspective when 
evaluating the fragments of Zeno’s argument, and the ancient argument against them,
can be detrimental to the task of determining Zeno’s original purpose. If Zeno’s 
paradoxes, and particularly Aristotle’s arguments against them, are described in 
modern mathematical terms then people are likely to treat these arguments as if they 
are purely mathematical arguments.  I will argue that this encourages the view that 
Zeno only uses physical examples in the paradoxes as analogies for describing these 
purely mathematical problems. 
My argument is significantly influenced by a brief comment made by Palmer in an 
article he wrote about Zeno in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2016). 
Palmer mentions that it is important to distinguish between the act of trying to 
determine Zeno’s original paradoxes and the act of trying to solve the paradoxes 
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(2016). He suggests that if one is too focused on trying to solve the paradoxes this 
will affect the interpretation which one can make of the paradoxes (2016). The 
purpose of my dissertation is to elaborate on this line of argument and discuss 
particular instances where, I will argue, this had occurred. 
For instance, the Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes are often described as involving 
the false statement that all infinite series of values sum to an infinite total. This 
modern way of describing the paradoxes can give the impression that the physical 
circumstance described in the paradoxes is only an analogy for a purely arithmetical 
problem.
This is an issue because there is no reason why one should discount the possibility 
that Zeno might have been primarily interested in the physics of the problem. In this 
paper I will discuss an interpretation of Zeno which I suggest is likely to be 
overlooked if Zeno is discussed in the context of modern mathematics. I will argue 
that Zeno might have posed his paradoxes because he was concerned that an 
extension could not be considered to have many extended parts without leading to 
absurd conclusions. Interpretations of this kind, and any other which does not 
presuppose modern mathematical concepts, are more likely to be overlooked if 
Zeno's paradoxes are summarised and explained in modern mathematical terms.
This, however, does not mean that there is no value in discussing how Zeno’s 
paradoxes have been appropriated and used by modern mathematicians to argue 
about modern mathematical problems.
Zeno paradoxes have been taken on as challenges by various mathematicians and 
have been used to explain modern mathematical views on the concept of infinity. 
Bertrand Russell, for instance, discusses Zeno’s Achilles paradox in his Principles of
Mathematics (1937 348). However,  Russell explicitly notes, when he discusses the 
Achilles paradox, that he is not interested in what Zeno was originally trying to argue
with the paradoxes and that he is only using it as an analogy for his arguments about 
mathematics (1937 348 (footnote)).
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I will argue that such modern mathematical treatments should not be considered to 
solve Zeno’s original paradoxes. This is simply because nobody is entirely certain 
what Zeno was originally trying to argue. The modern mathematical solutions 
instead pertain to modern problems which have been inspired by Zeno’s paradoxes.
Among classical scholars there is a broad range of arguments made regarding what 
Zeno might have been originally trying to argue.  Cajori (1920) provides a good 
summary of these kinds of arguments. For instance, it is sometimes argued that Zeno 
was specifically arguing against Pythagorean mathematics (Cajori 1920). It is also 
sometimes argued that Zeno might have been purely a sophist or someone who was 
was skilled in making a weak argument stronger (Cajori 1920). But, as Cajori points 
out, all of these arguments suffer from the fact that there is very little information 
about Zeno or his paradoxes in the known Greek fragments (1920). These theories 
remain plausible speculations about Zeno’s arguments but cannot be anything more. 
The article of Cajori to which I refer is a dated article which does not take into 
account some modern theories about Zeno. However, his basic point still stands 
because the newer theories suffer from the same lack of source material as do the 
ones which Cajori discusses1. 
Plato indicates that Zeno had written a book of 40 paradoxes and Plato suggests Zeno
had specifically written this book to defend the views of his teacher Parmenides 
(Plato’s Parmenides). We do not have access to Zeno's book. We only have access to
fragments of Zeno’s Paradoxes and some counter arguments made against them by 
Aristotle and others. Additionally, the arguments of Simplicius, a Neoplatonist from 
the 6th century CE, are used in discussions of Zeno, because it is thought that 
Simplicius had access to some of Zeno’s original arguments when he wrote his 
commentaries on Aristotle (Graham 2010 266). 
What this means is that to the extent that we might have an understanding of or 
theories about what Zeno was arguing, no modern thinker is in a position to show 
why Zeno was wrong – because we cannot be sure of what he was trying to show.
1 Palmer’s article (2016) about Zeno provides a more up to date and thorough discussion of the 
theories and arguments made about Zeno. However, I have referred to Cajori’s article (1920) 
because he deals more directly with the issue that there is very little evidence to work with when 
discussing Zeno.
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There is, however, value in simply assuming that ancient arguments against Zeno did
solve the paradoxes. If we assume that they did, then it provides us with a way of 
inferring what Zeno might have been arguing. Aristotle and Simplicius2 are two 
thinkers who, for argument's sake, we can assume did solve Zeno’s paradoxes or had 
insight into what Zeno was trying to argue.
Again this does not however mean that we should refrain from trying to solve 
modern arguments which use Zeno’s paradoxes as analogies. What it does mean is 
that there should be a clear distinction made between Zeno’s original argument and 
modern arguments. 
If a scholar who is interested in the modern mathematical significance of Zeno does 
not make this distinction then problems will arise. I suggest that a reader of the work 
of such a scholar would be left with the impression that Zeno’s arguments are 
mathematical arguments primarily about whether or not it is possible to sum up 
infinite sets of magnitudes. This kind of interpretation of Zeno would indicate that 
the physical circumstances described in the paradoxes are largely irrelevant: it would
indicate that Zeno is merely using a physical circumstance to give an analogy of a 
purely mathematical problem.
The problem with this mathematical reading of Zeno is that it is entirely possible that
Zeno’s argument was an argument about physics, not about pure mathematics. This 
is because there is not enough evidence in the fragments we have of Zeno’s 
arguments to indicate that his primary concern was that mathematicians would be 
unable to complete a certain kind of sum. I do not entirely discount a mathematical 
interpretation of Zeno’s original intended argument, however it is worthwhile 
considering other possibilities. For instance, I will be arguing that Zeno posed his 
paradoxes because he was concerned that extensions appeared to be merely 
collections of smaller extensions.
If this distinction is not made, then Zeno’s paradoxes will be confused with modern 
arguments which are inspired by them, and Zeno will be treated as a mathematician 
2 Because he is thought to have had access to Zeno’s original arguments.
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who unfortunately lacked various modern mathematical concepts. I will argue that 
this kind of interpretation of Zeno and his paradoxes does not reflect the arguments 
which Aristotle makes against Zeno.
I will suggest there is not a clear distinction made between Zeno’s original argument 
and modern arguments in Hugget’s article in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy (2010) or Dowden’s article in the Internet Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy (2016), both titled Zeno’s Paradoxes. By not making this distinction both
Hugget and Dowden obscure possible interpretations of Zeno’s paradoxes, and 
Aristotle’s solutions to them, which do not rely on modern mathematical concepts. 
Both Hugget and Dowden appear to recognise that modern discussions of Zeno are 
different from what Zeno might have been trying to argue. However, neither Hugget 
nor Dowden clearly identify that the modern solutions to Zeno’s paradoxes do not 
necessarily have anything to do with Zeno’s original argument. Both scholars move 
between discussion of modern solutions and ancient solutions without clearly 
identifying that they do not necessarily refer to the same paradoxes.
Dowden notes early in his article that he is not going to discuss the arguments which 
are made about what Zeno had originally intended to show with the paradoxes (2016 
section 1c). He appears to be specifically interested in what he calls the standard 
solutions to the paradoxes (2016 section 2). These standard solutions appear to 
revolve around modern mathematical conceptions of continuity (2016 section 2). The
issue with Dowden’s argument is that he does not clearly identify that these standard 
solutions cannot be assumed to have solved Zeno original paradoxes. 
Dowden does not clarify the difference between modern arguments which are 
inspired by Zeno and Zeno’s original intended argument. I will argue that this is 
evident when Dowden characterises Aristotle’s solutions to Zeno’s paradoxes as 
being insufficient specifically because Aristotle did not have access to calculus and 
because his solution used the concept of “potential infinities” which is not used in 
modern mathematics (Dowden 2016 section 2). The fact that Dowden identifies that 
Aristotle’s solutions are different to modern solutions is not an issue. But to claim 
that Aristotle’s solution is insufficient because he lacked certain modern concepts is 
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absurd. This is because it is not known what Zeno had intended to argue in the 
paradoxes that Aristotle set out to solve. If there was consensus about what Zeno was
trying to argue then, and only then, one could ask the question of whether modern 
mathematics is required to solve the paradoxes or whether those modern solutions 
make Aristotle’s solutions redundant. This problem can be alleviated by removing 
the claim that Aristotle’s solutions are made redundant by modern solutions and 
arguing instead that Aristotle’s solutions involve different assumptions or concepts to
those which occur in modern mathematics.
Hugget, in his article, is unclear as to whether he is interested in discussing the 
effects which Zeno’s paradoxes have had on the developments of modern 
mathematics or whether he is interested in determining the original purpose of the 
paradoxes. Hugget states that he is not interested in discussing the role which Zeno’s 
paradoxes have served in the development of modern mathematics (Hugget 2010 
section 1) but still argues that the solutions provided by Aristotle would not satisfy a 
modern mathematical thinker (2010 section 1)3.
I will suggest that the only reason one would discuss how modern thinkers would not
be satisfied with Aristotle’s solution to Zeno would be if one were interested in the 
influence of Zeno’s arguments on modern mathematical thinking. The question of 
whether or not modern mathematical thinkers would be satisfied by Aristotle’s 
solution to Zeno is not a question one should ask if one is interested in trying to 
determine what Zeno had intended to argue.
To give an example of how I would suggest Hugget ought to have discussed 
Aristotle –  if he were trying to determine Zeno’s original intended argument –  I will
attempt to infer what Zeno might have been arguing based on the arguments which 
Aristotle makes against Zeno. 
In summary, no modern thinker can legitimately claim to have solved Zeno's 
original paradoxes. 
3 Hugget suggests that Aristotle’s solutions might have been entirely sufficient to solve the 
problems which Zeno was originally trying to show with the paradoxes. 
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There are some fragments of the paradoxes and some ancient and medieval 
commentaries about the paradoxes. Also there are various modern theories posed by 
classical scholars about what the purpose of them might have been. However the 
ancient commentaries are very brief and the modern theories are often criticised for 
being very speculative and having little grounding in the known Ancient Greek texts.
If one is interested in Zeno’s original arguments then one might want to discuss 
Aristotle’s solution to Zeno’s paradoxes. However one is not in the position to judge 
whether or not Aristotle’s solution sufficiently solves Zeno’s paradoxes. The best 
that one can hope to do is to assume that Aristotle does solve Zeno’s paradoxes and 
then try to infer what Zeno might have been arguing from the arguments which 
Aristotle poses against him.
This, however, is complicated by the fact that Zeno’s paradoxes, and Aristotle’s 
solutions to them, have been used by many mathematicians over the course of history
to discuss various mathematical concepts such as infinite summation and actual 
infinite sets. So long as these topics are treated as completely independent from 
Zeno’s original argument then there is no problem with discussing how Zeno’s 
paradoxes are used in arguments about these concepts.
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Chapter One:
Detailed Summary of Argument
The Paradoxes and the Ancient Arguments About Them
Before I critique Hugget and Dowden’s articles about Zeno’s paradoxes I will first 
list and discuss some of the fragments which describe and argue against the 
paradoxes. I will be discussing the Dichotomy, Achilles and Plurality paradoxes. I 
have taken these passages from Graham’s collation of the Presocratic fragments 
(2010)4, Hardie and Gaye’s translation of Aristotle’s Physics and Joachim’s 
translation of Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption. 
Aristotle provides us with the most information about the Dichotomy and Achilles 
paradoxes. He describes the Dichotomy paradox in the following section of the 
Physics:
The first [the Dichotomy paradox] asserts the non-existence of motion on
the ground that that which is in locomotion must arrive at the half-way 
stage before it arrives at the goal.
(Aristotle Physics 239b11)
The Dichotomy paradox, from this passage, can be seen as describing the following 
circumstance. Suppose that there is a runner running some finite distance. Before the 
runner travels the entire distance the runner will reach a “halfway stage”. Before the 
runner can complete the last half of the run, the runner will reach another “halfway 
stage” between the mid point of the whole run and the end point of the whole run. 
The division can be repeated ad infinitum, and so there is an infinite set of half 
distances for the runner to run.
Alternatively, before the runner reaches the halfway point of the whole run the 
runner must first reach an earlier halfway point between the start and the halfway 
point of the whole run. There is an infinite number of these “halfways” involved in 
the motion.
4 It is from here that I have taken the passages from Simplicius.
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Aristotle describes the Achilles paradox in this passage of the Physics:
The second is the so-called 'Achilles', and it amounts to this, that in a race
the quickest runner can never overtake the slowest, since the pursuer 
must first reach the point whence the pursued started, so that the slower 
must always hold a lead. This argument is the same in principle as that 
which depends on bisection, though it differs from it in that the spaces 
with which we successively have to deal are not divided into halves.
 (Aristotle Physics 239b14) 
The Achilles paradox, described here, is considered, by Aristotle, to be the same 
basic argument as the Dichotomy. The Achilles paradox describes a race between a 
slower runner and a faster runner. The slower runner gets a head start. Before the 
faster runner can over take they must reach the point which the slower runner started 
from when the race began. By that time the slower runner will have moved forward. 
This catchup process must be repeated an infinite number of times before the faster 
runner over takes the slower. These catchups are considered to be equivalent to the 
half runs in the Dichotomy paradox.
Aristotle also provides an in depth argument against these two paradoxes which I 
will discuss at length later in my dissertation.
As for Zeno’s Plurality paradox, Simplicius reiterates parts of this paradox when 
commenting on the argument which Aristotle makes in On Generation and 
Corruption regarding the infinite divisibility of extended things. The passage from 
Simplicius which I will be focusing on is as follows:
…if there exists [many things], each thing must have some size and 
solidity, and one part must stand out from the other. And the same 
consideration applies to what projects from this. For it will have size and 
a part will project from it. And it is the same to say this once and always. 
For there will be nothing which can serve as a final part of this nor will 
one part be different from another. Thus if there are many things, they 
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must be both small and great: so small as to have no size, so great as to 
be unlimited. (Simplicius Physics 140.34-141.8)
The argument here appears to have some similarities in structure to the Dichotomy 
paradox. Specifically, both arguments seem to involve the assertion that there is an 
infinite set of smaller parts within a larger thing. The Argument which Simplicius 
describes in this passage is suggested to be the origin of the argument which 
Aristotle makes in this passage from On Generation and Corruption (Hugget 2010):
Hence the same principle will apply whenever a body is by nature 
divisible through and through, whether by bisection, or generally by any 
method whatever: nothing impossible will have resulted if it has actually 
been divided – not even if it has been divided into innumerable parts, 
themselves divided innumerable times. Nothing impossible will have 
resulted, though perhaps nobody in fact could so divide it. 
Since, therefore, the body is divisible through and through, let it have 
been divided. What, then, will remain? A magnitude? No: that is 
impossible, since then there will be something not divided, whereas ex 
hypothesi the body was divisible through and through. But if it be 
admitted that neither a body nor a magnitude will remain, and yet 
division is to take place, the constituents of the body will either be points 
(i.e. without magnitudes) or absolutely nothing. (Aristotle On 
Generation and Corruption 316a 20-30)
I use this passage from Aristotle to construct an alternative interpretation of what 
Aristotle was arguing against Zeno to those given by Hugget and Dowden.
Discussions of the Paradoxes in Modern Terms
The first part of my argument will be dedicated to identifying what I suggest is an 
ambiguity in Hugget’s and Dowden’s articles. Neither scholar clearly identifies that 
modern solutions to Zeno’s paradoxes ought not be treated as solutions to Zeno’s 
original paradoxes and that they should instead be treated as solutions to problems 
which Zeno’s paradoxes have led modern thinkers to consider.
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It is not that either Hugget or Dowden explicitly or intentionally depict Zeno's 
paradoxes as modern problems with modern solutions and consider Aristotle’s 
solutions fundamentally flawed. My concern with these articles is that they do not 
separate modern arguments from ancient arguments as much as, I will suggest, they 
should be.
To show the issues with Hugget and Dowden’s articles I will discuss Zeno’s 
Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes focusing primarily on Aristotle’s solution to 
these particular paradoxes. I will first discuss how Hugget and Dowden describe 
Aristotle’s solution. I will argue that both Hugget and Dowden misrepresent 
Aristotle’s solution because they are more interested in showing why modern 
thinkers would not be satisfied with Aristotle’s solution or would not be willing to 
make some of the assumptions which Aristotle’s appears to make in his arguments. 
Aristotle treats both the Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes as presenting 
fundamentally the same argument. Aristotle’s solution to them is split into two main 
sections.
Aristotle’s first discussion of the Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes spans 233a and 
233b in the Physics. In this argument Aristotle argues that because the time taken to 
travel a half of distance will be half the time taken to travel the whole distance the 
time taken to traverse the complete motion in the Dichotomy will always be finite 
because each successive run will will take proportionally less time to complete.
Aristotle revisits the Dichotomy and Achilles paradox later in the Physics, at 263a to 
263b10, and suggests that his initial solution, the argument about the proportionality 
of the size of each successive run in the paradoxes, did not satisfactorily address the 
problem of the paradoxes. 
Hugget and Dowden both claim that neither of Aristotle's solutions would satisfy a 
modern thinker because he does not provide a method for summing the size of each 
of the infinite set of runs described in the paradoxes. Hugget and Dowden both argue
that the second part of his solution is a way of avoiding (and not addressing) this 
problem by positing that there is only ever a finite amount of divisions made of the 
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runs (in the Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes) at any one time and thus the sum 
would always be of a finite number of things and thus the sum can always be 
performed. The run is still considered to be infinitely divisible because, although it 
can only be divided a finite number of times at any one time, it can always be further 
divided up. This kind of infinity is called a potential infinity because it is infinite in 
regard to what it can potentially be – as opposed to what it actually is5.
Hugget and Dowden argue that Aristotle’s solution would not be seen as satisfactory 
by modern thinkers. The reason for this is two fold. Firstly we now have methods for
summing infinite sets of values. Secondly the concept of a potential infinity is not 
used by modern mathematicians given that we have Set theory which allows 
mathematicians to work with complete infinite sets. 
Aristotle identifies a related issue with infinities in On Generation and Corruption 
where he says that an extended thing cannot be completely divided an infinite 
number of times (316a-316b)6. This is related to Zeno’s Dichotomy and Achilles 
paradoxes because both those paradoxes describe extensions, in the form of finite 
motions, which are infinitely divided.
 Aristotle’s argument is that the smaller elements which result from the complete 
infinite division of an extended thing are points without extension. Thus the results 
of a complete division of an extended thing, a set of points, cannot be said to be the 
constituent elements of the thing which had been divided. This is because an 
extended thing cannot be made of non-extended things (316b 5). 
According to Hugget, this has been overcome by Set theorists. Hugget refers to an 
argument posed by Grünbaum (1967) to show this. The particular part of 
Grünbaum’s argument in question proceeds as follows. Grünbaum’s discussion starts
from the idea that a continuous line is an “assemblage of points” where each point 
has no size (Grünbaum 1967 122). If this is the case then it would seem impossible 
that the line could have a size (Grünbaum 1967 122). This is not a problem, 
5 An example of an actually infinite thing would be a collection or set which had an infinite number
of elements or an extent which is infinitely large.
6 Hugget notes that this argument is considered to have originated from Zeno’s plurality paradox 
(section 2.3 2010) which I will discuss later in of this dissertation.
12
according to Grünbaum, because a line is not defined (in mathematics) as a set of 
points. Instead a line is defined as “the union of unextended unit point sets” 
(Grünbaum 1967 126). A unit point set is a set which contains only one element and 
that element specifically being a geometric point. A unit point set differs from a 
geometric point in that it can be put into union with other unit point sets to define a 
region which has a size. It is within that region which the points are distributed, but it
is the region which provides the size and not the points. Thus a line or any extension,
when defined as a union of unit point sets, does in fact have a size. Hugget’s 
interpretation of Grünbaum’s argument is that an extension is a set of points with a 
size function (2010). I will suggest this is to say that an extension is a region within 
which the set of points are located.
I agree that Aristotle does not demonstrate how an infinite set of values can be 
summed and also that he does not allow for extensions to be infinitely divided up. 
However this is no reason to conclude that Aristotle’s solution was inadequate given 
that we do not yet know what the paradox was intended to show7. 
I will be assuming that Aristotle’s full8 argument is entirely adequate as it stands. I 
will do this for two reasons. Firstly because we do not have Zeno’s original 
Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes to compare it against – all we have are the brief 
descriptions which Aristotle himself gives of the two paradoxes9. Secondly by 
assuming Aristotle does solve the paradoxes I ultimately intend to show, in the last 
part of this dissertation, how one might infer what Zeno might have argued from the 
7 I am unsure what Hugget’s view on this is because he suggests that Aristotle’s solutions might 
have been sufficient to satisfy Zeno, but he makes no claim about the influence which Zeno has 
had on the development of modern mathematics (2010). As I mentioned earlier I suggest that 
there is no reason to ask if Aristotle’s solutions satisfy modern thinkers unless one is interested in 
the influence which Zeno’s paradoxes and Aristotle’s solutions to them have had on the 
development of modern mathematics. I suggest that Hugget needs to be more clear as to whether 
or not he is claiming that Aristotle’s solutions solve Zeno’s original paradoxes.
8 By “Aristotle’s full argument” against the Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes I am including the 
second part of Aristotle’s argument which I have not discussed yet.
9 I am separating the descriptions which Aristotle gives of the Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes 
from the arguments (Aristotle Physics 239b11 and Aristotle Physics 239 b14) which he makes 
against them. While Aristotle does provide brief arguments against them after he describes them, 
the bulk of his counter arguments are in other parts of the Physics.
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particular arguments which Aristotle makes against him. I will argue that Aristotle 
was of the view that an extension, like the run described in the paradoxes, is not 
fundamentally collections of smaller extensions. I will argue that Aristotle’s view as 
to what an extension is revolves around his definition of a continuous extension. I 
will return to this argument in more detail after I discuss the second part of 
Aristotle’s solution to the Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes.
I will be further suggesting that the modern understanding of the terms actual and 
potential infinity to which Hugget and Dowden refer do not necessarily reflect the 
ways in which Aristotle was using the terms in his solution to Zeno. I will suggest 
that definitions which Hugget and Dowden give to these terms reflect how they were 
understood when Set theory was first being considered by Cantor and others who set 
out to show that mathematicians could work with complete infinite sets. The efforts 
of Cantor and other early Set theorists in convincing other mathematicians that they 
could work with complete infinite sets was significant in the development of modern 
mathematics. However, as I will argue, Aristotle might not have meant the same 
thing as modern set theorists do when he discussed an actual infinite set. Specifically,
I will argue that Aristotle was more interested in how infinites manifest in the world 
and that he was of the view that there was never an actually infinitely divided thing 
nor were there things of actual infinite size; none the less, Aristotle required that 
there be an actual infinity of potential points at which an extended thing could be 
divided. But first I will discuss the traditional understanding of Aristotle’s views on 
infinity.
As Hankinson notes, in the Cambridge guide to Aristotle, Aristotle is traditionally 
believed to have denied that there were complete (or actual) infinities (1995 140). It 
is suggested that Aristotle argued that an infinity was instead something which could 
always increase and was never complete – hence the term potential infinity was used 
because there was an infinite potential to increase but not an infinite amount or 
magnitude (Hankinson 1995 140). It is suggested, from this, that Aristotle was a 
Finitist or someone who believed that mathematics only ever work with finite 
numbers of things each being finite in magnitude (Hankinson 1995 140). Hugget and
Dowden seem to take a similar position.
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I will propose an alternative interpretation of Aristotle’s arguments about infinities, 
actual and potential, and how he uses them to solve the Achilles and Dichotomy 
paradoxes. I will suggest that Aristotle was solely interested in how infinities 
manifested physical and temporal extensions as we encounter them in the world. I 
will argue that the second part of Aristotle's solution to the Dichotomy and Achilles 
paradoxes is the argument that there is an actual infinity of potential divisions which 
can be found in any given continuous extension but that the extension itself cannot 
be reduced to that set of divisions. I will suggest that this is similar to Grünbaum’s 
claim that an extension is not merely a collection of points; the difference of course 
is that Aristotle is talking about divisions rather than points and that he does not go 
on to define a continuous extension as a union of unit point sets10.
Even though Aristotle does not give the neat definition of a continuous extension 
which Grünbaum does (1967 126) he does still highlight that a continuous extension 
is not a collection of points and neither is it a collection of the divisions which can be
made of it. Aristotle specifically criticises Zeno for confusing infinite extent with 
infinite divisibility (Aristotle Physics 233a20-25). I will suggest from this that 
Aristotle's main argument against Zeno was that the number of divisions which can 
be made of an infinitely divisible thing has no relation to that things size. Aristotle 
argues that an infinitely divisible extension (a continuous extension) is not 
fundamentally an infinite collection of smaller extensions. The fact that there is an 
infinite set of half distances within any distance (as the Dichotomy paradox 
indicates) is merely accidental property of a continuous extension and does not 
represent what that extension essentially is (Aristotle Physics 263b9-10).
But just as much as Hugget and Dowden can only speculate that modern thinkers can
solve Zeno’s paradoxes, I can only speculate as to whether Aristotle did solve the 
paradoxes and how he might have done so. There is however value in simply 
assuming that Aristotle did solve the paradoxes. Aristotle is much more historically 
proximate to Zeno and it is possible that Aristotle had access to Zeno’s book which 
Plato alludes11 to. Thus it is reasonable, for practical purposes, to assume that 
10 Aristotle’s argument in On Generation and Corruption from 316a-316b, discussed earlier, is 
expressed in terms of points. The second part of Aristotle’s solution to the Dichotomy and 
Achilles paradoxes is expressed in terms of divisions.
11 Refer to Plato's Parmenides.
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Aristotle did solve the paradoxes because his arguments are the most suitable, 
currently known12, arguments for scholars to infer Zeno’s arguments from.
An Alternative Interpretation of Zeno 
The last part of my argument will be an example of how one could go about inferring
what Zeno might have been trying to argue from Aristotle’s argument against him in 
the Physics, or at least my interpretation of Aristotle's argument. The interpretation 
which I will make of Zeno is similar to the interpretation which G.E.L. Owen posed 
in his article Zeno and the Mathematicians. Owen argued that Zeno had assumed that
it was problematic to assume that extension was a plurality of parts. This is 
specifically because if it is assumed that all extensions are composed of smaller 
extensions, including all of those smaller extensions, then it is impossible to locate 
the units of this plurality. There appears to be an infinite number of smaller 
extensions. If they have a finite size then the larger extension which is defined as a 
collection of those smaller extensions will be infinite in size. If they have no size 
then nothing will have size. 
I will argue for this interpretation in two stages.
Firstly, I will summarise my interpretation of Aristotle’s argument. I will infer 
Zeno’s argument from the arguments which Aristotle uses against him. 
Secondly, I will argue that this interpretation can be seen to reflect the Simplicius 
reconstruction of a part of Zeno’s plurality paradox. For the sake of simplicity I will 
assume that Zeno’s Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes are more particular and 
complicated versions of Zeno’s Plurality paradox. 
I will finish my discussion by arguing that someone who used Hugget or Dowden’s 
article to get a summary of what arguments are made about Zeno would be unlikely 
to consider the kind of interpretation of Zeno which I have discussed. This is not 
necessarily because Hugget and/or Dowden would not consider it a fair 
interpretation, but because both of these scholars insist on framing their discussion of
Zeno in terms of modern mathematics. 
12 Allowing for the possibility that Zeno’s book might yet be located.
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Chapter Two: 
Issues with Hugget's and Dowden’s Discussions of
Zeno’s Paradoxes and Aristotle’s Solutions
To begin with I will discuss how Hugget describes the Achilles and Dichotomy 
paradoxes.
Hugget discusses the Dichotomy paradox in chapter 3.1 and the Achilles paradox in 
chapter 3.2 of his article on Zeno. In this article Hugget’s main claim appears to be 
that the problems that Zeno’s paradoxes have raised could not be completely solved 
until we had developed modern mathematical methods regarding infinite summation 
and infinite sets (2010). I argue that this misrepresents the original paradoxes in that 
such modern solutions are solutions to modern problems, not those originally posed 
by the paradoxes.
Hugget notes that the paradoxes have given rise to new problems. 
That said, it is also the majority opinion that—with certain qualifications—
Zeno's paradoxes reveal some problems that cannot be resolved without the full
resources of mathematics as worked out in the Nineteenth century (and perhaps
beyond). This is not (necessarily) to say that modern mathematics is required to
answer any of the problems that Zeno explicitly wanted to raise; arguably 
Aristotle and other ancients had replies that would—or should—have satisfied 
Zeno. (Nor do I wish to make any particular claims about Zeno's influence on 
the history of mathematics.) However, as mathematics developed, and more 
thought was given to the paradoxes, new difficulties arose from them; these 
difficulties require modern mathematics for their resolution. These new 
difficulties arise partly in response to the evolution in our understanding of 
what mathematical rigor demands: solutions that would satisfy Aristotle's 
standards of rigor would not satisfy ours. Thus we shall push several of the 
paradoxes from their common sense formulations to their resolution in modern 
mathematics. (Another qualification: I will offer resolutions in terms of 
‘standard’ mathematics, but other modern formulations are also capable of 
dealing with Zeno.)  (Hugget 2010 section 1)
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In this passage Hugget acknowledges that these new problems are not necessarily 
what Zeno was originally trying to show with the paradoxes and he also suggests that
Aristotle perhaps satisfactory solved the original arguments. However, Hugget then 
goes on to claim that Aristotle’s solution would no longer be considered satisfactory 
because it does not deal with the new problems which have since been found. More 
generally Hugget claims that Zeno’s paradoxes require a modern modern 
mathematical solution. 
It does not make sense to say that Aristotle’s solutions to Zeno’s paradoxes are not 
satisfactory because they do not answer these new problems. The paradoxes as posed
by Zeno are not about problems which modern thinkers have raised. Thus, it is not 
Zeno’s paradoxes which are being resolved by modern mathematics, as Hugget 
appears to suggest. Instead,  the problems which are are being resolved are modern 
problems which have been inspired by or based on the fragments of Zeno’s 
paradoxes.
To explain this in another way, consider Hugget's claim that “Aristotle's standards of 
rigor would not satisfy ours (our modern mathematical standards)”. What modern 
mathematics demands is only relevant to the modern versions of the paradoxes. It is 
not relevant to the ancient paradoxes. If one requires that Aristotle’s solutions to 
Zeno must satisfy the “rigor” of modern mathematics, then it is assumed that Zeno’s 
paradoxes and Aristotle’s solutions were simply primitive mathematical arguments. 
This ignores the possibility that Zeno and Aristotle were not arguing about 
mathematics, but instead about the constitution of extended things in the physical 
world. Over the course of this chapter I will be arguing this in greater detail.
Hugget's starting point for his discussion of both the Dichotomy and Achilles 
paradoxes is that both paradoxes can be reduced down to infinite series which sum to
a finite total. This is particularly clear in the Dichotomy paradox. 
To reiterate the circumstance in the Dichotomy paradox, a runner is trying to run 
some particular distance. Before the runner can complete that distance the runner 
needs to run half that distance. Hence the first term of a series is ½. Then before the 
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runner can complete the second half of the run the runner must complete half of the 
remaining distance, which is ¼ of the whole distance. This series of half-runs 
proceeds indefinitely, The paradox can be reduced to the set of values “1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 
1/16, … and so on” which in a more general form is 1/2n for n=1 to infinity. 
The Achilles paradox can also be reduced to an infinite series of shorter and shorter 
runs. 
If we were to sum the terms in these series, the more terms that we include in the 
sum, the closer the total will get to the value of one. The sum of any finite number of 
terms of this series cannot exceed the value of one. Thus it is inferred that when all 
the terms have been summed the total will be 1. I will explain the reasoning behind 
how this infinite sum can be performed later, but first I will discuss how Aristotle 
initially discusses the paradoxes.
Hugget notes that Aristotle initially makes an argument similar to this (Aristotle 
Physics 233a-233b) but does not use a method of infinite summation (Hugget 2010 
section 3)13.  In a simple sense, Aristotle agues that the sum of all the divisions of a 
finite extension will always sum to the original finite magnitude of that extension, 
but he does not initially discuss summing an infinite number of them. Hugget does 
not discuss Aristotle’s argument in much detail – his article was more a broad 
overview than an in-depth analysis – so I will elaborate on his line of argument. 
Consider the following section from Aristotle’s Physics:
… if time is continuous, magnitude is continuous also, inasmuch as a 
thing passes over half a given magnitude in half the time taken to cover 
the whole: in fact without qualification it passes over a less magnitude in 
less time; for the divisions of time and of magnitude will be the same .
(Aristotle Physics 233a10-20)
The term “continuous” in this section refers to the idea that the extension – the 
distance covered in the Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes – is infinitely divisible14. 
13 Dowden also briefly mentions that Aristotle makes an argument of this sort (2016 section 4)
14 Aristotle’s definition of a continuum is more sophisticated than just that a thing is infinitely 
divisible. But, for the time being, all that is important is that it is infinitely divisible.
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This term is used to reflect the structure of the argument used by Zeno in the 
Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes. Both these paradoxes appear to involve the 
assumption that there is no smallest kind of division and hence that extension is 
infinitely divisible. This is what allows for there to be an infinite set of half distances 
to complete the run (in the Dichotomy paradox) or catchups for the faster runner to 
overtake (in the Achilles paradox).
Aristotle argues his point by splitting the problem in two. First the distances being 
travelled, and second the time taken to travel any particular one of these distances. In
terms of the Dichotomy paradox the distances being travelled are the half-way runs 
and the time taken refers to the time taken to run each half-way.
The argument is that the amount of time taken to complete any of the individual half-
way runs in the Dichotomy paradox is a proportion of the time taken to travel the 
whole finite distance in the paradox. This is because the amount of time which it 
takes to travel half the distance will need to be half the amount of time to travel the 
whole distance and similarly a lesser amount of time for the smaller portions of the 
run15. Thus each successive run, which needs to be made by the runner in the 
Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes, will take less and less time to complete because 
each successive run is over a shorter distance than those previous. Furthermore any 
division of an extension when added to the remaining part or parts of that extension 
will sum to the size of the undivided extension.
Aristotle argues this point further by showing that it is impossible for a motion over a
finite distance to take an infinite time (233a30-233b15). Aristotle’s argument 
proceeds as follows. Suppose there is some given motion from A to B. Supposed that
the distance between A and B is finite. Supposed that the time taken to complete the 
motion is infinite. Consider a finite portion of that infinite total time. Over that finite 
portion of time a finite distance16 must have been traversed. This finite distance will 
15 There is an unstated assumption, in this argument, that the runner is running at a constant speed 
over the course of the motion
16 This argument does not take infinitesimals into account. For instance, it might be claimed that if 
you consider a finite period of time of this motion, which is taking an infinite time, the distance 
covered would not be finite but infinitesimal. In Aristotle’s defence there is arguably nothing to 
distinguish an object which has moved an infinitesimal distance from a stationary object.
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be some portion or measure of the finite distance travelled: specifically a finite 
number of them will fit into the total finite distance from A to B. thus to total time 
taken to travel from A to B must similarly be finite because there can only be a finite 
number of these finite periods in this finite motion. Thus it is impossible for a 
moving thing travelling at a constant speed to take an infinite amount of time to 
complete a finite motion as is apparently the case in the Dichotomy and Achilles 
paradoxes.
A question that remains unanswered at this point is how can an extension have an 
infinite number of parts to it17. The reason why an extension would have an infinite 
number of parts is because motion as the Dichotomy paradox indicates can be 
divided into halves (or any other portions) indefinitely.
All that Aristotle deals with in his initial solution is why a finite extension cannot be 
traversed in an infinite time. He does not discuss how it is possible for an extension 
to have an infinite number of divisions within it.
Hugget indicates that Aristotle was not completely satisfied with this first solution 
and returns later to give a second solution. The section which Hugget is referring to 
is as follows: 
Now when we first discussed the question of motion we put forward a 
solution of this difficulty turning on the fact that the period of time 
occupied in traversing the distance contains within itself an infinite 
number of units: there is no absurdity, we said, in supposing the 
traversing of infinite distances in infinite time, and the element of infinity
is present in the time no less than in the distance18. But, although this 
17 As I will later discuss, Aristotle considered this to be a problem in On Generation and Corruption
316a-316b
18 This passage is the summary of the argument at 233a 20-35 in the Physics. When Aristotle 
suggest that infinite distances will be traversed in infinite time he is making the claim: that if you 
divide up the distance travelled of a motion into infinitely many parts then there will be 
corresponding set of infinite divisions of the time taken to traverse the distance which when 
summed will equal the original period of time to complete the travel (Aristotle 233a 20-35). The 
important point is that when Aristotle talks about traversing the infinite distances in infinite time 
he is talking about an infinite set of divisions not an infinite period or extension of time.
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solution is adequate as a reply to the questioner (the question asked being
whether it is possible in a finite time to traverse or reckon an infinite 
number of units), nevertheless as an account of the fact and explanation 
of its true nature it is inadequate. (Aristotle Physics 263a10-20)
On initial reading of Hugget’s article It appears that Hugget is claiming that Aristotle
revisits the Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes specifically to solve the problem with
Cauchy’s method of infinite summation.
The idea is that Aristotle took a common sense view that an infinite collection of 
finite magnitudes would always sum to an infinite value. To use one of Hugget’s 
examples “1+1+1+...”, would equal an infinite magnitude (2010 section 2.2) 19. 
Given that the partial runs in the Achilles and Dichotomy are all finite in length then 
common sense would indicate that the total run, in each paradox, would need to be 
infinite in length.
Of course a set of values like “1+1+1+...” does not describe the size of the smaller 
runs in either the Dichotomy or Achilles paradoxes. Aristotle appears to 
acknowledge this when he argues that the time taken to complete each successive run
in the Dichotomy would halve each time (Physics 233a-233b). What Aristotle does 
not use in his argument however is the notion that the terms in the series approach 
zero and that the sum of those terms approach a particular finite value. This is the 
sort of reasoning which Hugget is referring to when he alludes to Cauchy’s method 
of infinite summation.
The idea that an infinite set of values can sum to a finite value can be seen to relate to
the Dichotomy paradox as follows. The lengths of the half runs in the Dichotomy 
paradox can be expressed as 1/2n for n=1 to infinity. For instance, the sixth run which
the runner makes is 1/(26) or 1/64th of the total original finite distance being run. If 
we were to sum up the terms in the series the total will get very close to 1 but never 
exceed it.
19 This example is actually used to discuss one of Zeno’s plurality paradoxes, but I suggest that it is 
applicable in this discussion of the Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes.
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Let us assume that the distance being run by the runner in the Dichotomy paradox is 
1 unit of distance. In terms of the situation of the Dichotomy paradox, the runner 
runs half the distance to begin with. So the first term of our sum is ½. After this the 
runner then runs half of the remaining half which is ¼ of the whole run. Our sum so 
far is ½ + ¼.  No matter how many of the half runs we include in the sum the total 
will never be greater than 1. For instance ½ + ¼  … + 1/1024 = 0.999023437520. 
From this it is inferred that because the sum of any conceivable finite set of the terms 
within this series will never exceed 1, then the sum of all of the terms must be 1. 
Thus, despite the apparent infinite number of smaller motions involved in the 
motion, the entire motion is still very much finite. Another way to express this is to 
say that 1 is the limit of the infinite sum: 1/(2n) for n=1 to infinity.
I would not suggest that Hugget is claiming that Cauchy’s method of infinite 
summation solves Zeno’s original paradox and that Aristotle’s argument does not. 
However I would suggest that because Hugget frames his discussion of Aristotle’s 
solution in direct comparison to Cauchy’s method of infinite summation a reader 
would be left with the impression that Zeno’s paradoxes and Aristotle’s solutions are 
merely examples of arguments from people who lacked a method for infinite 
summation. 
Because the original purpose of Zeno’s paradoxes is unknown it is not helpful to 
compare modern solutions with ancient solutions in this way. It is entirely possible 
that Zeno’s Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes and Cauchy’s method of infinite 
summation pertain to different problems. The reason I say this is that if the 
Dichotomy is treated as simply the fallacious claim that the sum of the infinite series 
1/(2n) for n=1 to infinity equals infinity, then the physical aspect of the paradox, the 
runner and the distance run, become irrelevant. Taking this kind of approach to the 
paradox reduces it to a simple arithmetical problem. While I would not rule out the 
possibility that Zeno might have been making this argument, I would suggest that his
argument was more about the physical circumstance.
If it were the case that Zeno was simply making the fallacious statement that an 
infinite series of finite values can never sum to a finite total, then it would be fair to 
20 From mathematics, the sum of n half runs is 1-1/2n.
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say that Aristotle does not really demonstrate why that statement is wrong. However 
there are alternative possibilities for what Zeno might have been arguing.
Dowden in his article seems even more dismissive than Hugget of the first part of 
Aristotle's solution to the Dichotomy paradox. He states that: 
However, Aristotle merely asserted this [it is possible to traverse an 
infinite number of smaller distances in a finite period of time or that the 
sum of the divisions of a finite extent would always equal the original 
finite magnitude] and could give no detailed theory that enables the 
computation of the finite amount of time. So, Aristotle could not really 
defend his diagnosis of Zeno's error. Today the calculus is used to 
provide the Standard Solution with that detailed theory. 
(Dowden 2016 section 3.a.ii) 
From this statement I suggest that a reader could be forgiven for thinking that 
Dowden is of the view that Aristotle could not really solve the Dichotomy paradox. 
Dowden however does assure the reader earlier in his article that he would refrain 
from entering into a debate about whether or not Aristotle did solve Zeno’s 
paradoxes (2016 section 2). 
I suggest however that Dowden did not even need to make this comparison between 
the methods employed in Calculus and Aristotle’s solution to the Dichotomy. Again, 
this is because the purposes of Zeno’s paradoxes are not known. The fact that 
Aristotle cannot sum infinite sets of things or, as I will discuss next, uses the concept 
of a potential infinity which is no longer used in modern mathematics, need not 
imply that he did not solve the Dichotomy paradox.
What I have not yet discussed is what Aristotle’s second argument against the 
Dichotomy and Achilles paradox is (Aristotle Physics 263a-263b10). What I hope to 
have shown thus far however is that Hugget's and Dowden’s articles give the 
impression that Aristotle returned to the paradoxes because he needed to provide a 
way of getting around the fact that he lacked a method for summing the infinite set of
smaller runs which take place in the Achilles and Dichotomy paradoxes. Hugget or 
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Dowden might not have intended to argue this, but I suggest that the fact that they 
insist on comparing Aristotle’s methods to modern methods and pointing out why we
would not be satisfied with Aristotle’s methods, does leave the reader with this 
impression.
Dowden discusses the second part of Aristotle’s solution to the Dichotomy and 
Achilles paradoxes in section 4 of his article. Dowden’s interpretation of Aristotle’s 
solution to the Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes is summarised in the following 
passage from his article: 
Aristotle believes it is impossible for a thing to pass over an actually 
infinite number of things in a finite time, but that it is possible for a thing 
to pass over a potentially infinite number of things in a finite time. 
(Dowden 2016 section 4)
Dowden notes that the term potential infinity is normally interpreted to specifically 
refer to a set of things which is being continually added to (Dowden 2016 section 4). 
An actual infinity on the other hand is normally interpreted to be a complete infinite 
set (Dowden 2016 section 4). 
What this would imply is that Aristotle was saying that the motions which Zeno 
describes can be continually further divided up, but are not ever divided up the 
infinite number of times that the wording of the paradoxes would imply. This in turn 
means that there is only a finite number of distances which the runners in the 
paradoxes have to travel and they are all of a distinct finite size.
This avoids infinite summation by requiring that there is never an infinite number of 
things to sum. This does not mean that Aristotle had specifically set out to avoid 
performing infinite summation. The reason that I mention it is because as I 
previously indicated Dowden states that Aristotle was unable to defend his claim 
against Zeno because he lacked modern mathematical methods (Dowden 2016 
section 3.a.ii). This, I suggest, would appear to imply that Zeno’s paradoxes require a
method for infinite summation to solve them and this, in turn, would imply that 
Zeno’s paradoxes revolve around the idea of infinite summation.
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This interpretation of potential and actual infinity assumed by Dowden is not an 
uncommon interpretation. For instance, it is equivalent to what Hankinson argues in 
the Cambridge Companion to Aristotle (1995 140). Hankinson argues that Aristotle 
was a Finitist in the sense that he rejects the idea that there are actualised infinite sets
of things: specifically that he rejects that there is an actual infinite set of natural 
numbers21. Aristotle’s view is instead that there are potential infinities. With regards 
to a set of things, a potential infinity is a set which can always have more added to it 
or more divisions made of it (Hankinson 1995 141). For instance, the run in the 
Dichotomy paradox can always be further divided up, but can never be completely 
divided up.
I will now briefly discuss what parts of Aristotle’s arguments Hankinson is building 
his argument from. Consider the following passages:
Number on the other hand is a plurality of ‘ones’ and a certain quantity 
of them. Hence number must stop at the indivisible: for ‘two’ and ‘three’ 
are merely derivative terms, and so with each of the other numbers. But 
in the direction of largeness it is always possible to think of a larger 
number: for the number of times a magnitude can be bisected is infinite. 
Hence this infinite is potential, never actual... 
(Aristotle Physics 207b5-10)
 ...they [mathematicians] do not need the infinite and do not use it. They 
postulate only that the finite straight line may be produced as far as they 
wish... (Aristotle Physics 207b30)
From these passages it would seem reasonable to say firstly that Aristotle considered 
infinity to be something which was continually added to rather than complete, and 
secondly that he did not believe mathematicians had need of infinities beyond this 
potential understanding of it.
21 Natural numbers are positive integers: like 1,2,3,4 and so on.
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The beginning of this passage seems to indicate, as Hankinson suggests (1995 140), 
that Aristotle considers that there are only finite sets of numbers where the larger 
finite sets are derived as and when they are needed. I will return to Aristotle’s 
understanding of infinities later, but first I will return to Dowden’s discussion of 
Aristotle’s solution to the Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes.
With regards to the Dichotomy paradox, Dowden’s interpretations of Aristotle’s 
argument is that the number of divisions of the run which are being added together 
will always be finite. By virtue of this it always is possible to sum up the size of each
smaller run made. For instance, consider the first three runs of the in the dichotomy 
plus the remainder: presume that the runner run has completed ½, ¼  and 1/8  of the 
run and has one more 1/8 of the run to complete. Sum up all of these elements and 
you will end up with the size of the whole finite run. No matter how many of the 
possible runs are considered, the sum of the distance run, plus the remainder, will 
always be finite.
Dowden does not explicitly discuss precisely what I have just described, but I believe
that he is suggesting that Aristotle used this kind of argument against the Dichotomy 
and Achilles paradoxes (Dowden 2016 section 4).
However Dowden again adds a comparison between Aristotle’s argument and 
modern arguments as can be seen in the following statement:
Today’s standard treatment of the Achilles paradox disagrees with 
Aristotle's way out of the paradox and says Zeno was correct to use the 
concept of a completed infinity and to imply the runner must go to an 
actual infinity of places in a finite time. (Dowden 2016 section 4)
Identifying that Aristotle uses methods which modern thinkers would not is fine. 
However, claiming that Aristotle did not solve Zeno’s paradoxes as a consequence of
this is unreasonable. We do not really know what Zeno originally was trying to 
argue. Thus modern arguments about Zeno should be treated as different arguments.
27
Hugget provides a slightly different way of interpreting Aristotle’s argument. The 
claim is that size of an extension is not a result of the addition of a collection of 
actual divisions of that extension. Zeno’s paradoxes appear to imply that in the 
Achilles and Dichotomy paradoxes, a runner would need to complete an infinite 
number of separate tasks. Hugget suggests that Aristotle argues that Zeno’s 
description does not represent the task which a runner would actually need to 
undertake in order to move any given distance (Hugget 2010 section 3.1). The claim 
is that if it were to be actually divided up, then the extension would be intermittent or
discontinuous. 
Aristotle’s reasoning is that if you actually divided a thing into completely separate 
segments then the end of one segment is separate from the start of its subsequent. 
What this means for the runner in the Dichotomy paradox is that the end of one of 
the half runs will be distinct from the start of the next, and will not strictly follow 
continuously from the previous.  Thus, to the extent that there are divisions in a 
continuous extent, those divisions are are potentials which are generated as and when
they are needed.
For an example of this argument, imagine that Zeno is a photographer taking 
photographs of Achilles racing the against the tortoise (or slower runner) as per the 
Achilles paradox. Presume that Zeno, being who he is, decides to take a photo at the 
beginning of every one of the infinite sequence of catchups described in the paradox. 
Unless Zeno has impossibly fast reflexes and some kind of magical camera which 
can function faster than the speed of light, this task is impossible22. However, 
Achilles does not need to complete a task of this nature when he runs; even if his run 
can be potentially divided up in this way. When Achilles runs he would not need to, 
for instance, carry a camera on a stick and photograph himself at each assigned 
moment – he would just run the finite distance required to overtake the tortoise.
Dowden also briefly refers to some similar ways of challenging Zeno's Achilles 
paradox.  For instance: “Achilles’ feet aren’t obligated to stop and start again at each 
[of the catchup] location[s]”; Zeno is unreasonable in requiring that Achilles 
22 This kind of task is known as a super task and is discussed at length by Max Black (1950)
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continually aims to complete each run behind the tortoise (Dowden 2016 section 
3.a.i). 
Largely I agree with Hugget’s interpretation of this part of Aristotle’s solution. 
However, like Dowden, Hugget compares Aristotle’s solutions with modern 
solutions.  Hugget suggests that a modern thinker would not be satisfied with 
Aristotle's solution because it makes use of the concept of a potential infinite. His 
argument is that because we now have Set theory from Cantor, a modern thinker 
would appear to not require potential infinities because Set theory allows 
mathematicians to work directly with complete infinite sets (Hugget 2010 section 
3.1). 
Again, comparing Aristotle’s solutions to modern solutions is an unhelpful 
comparison to make. It involves the assumption that Zeno was making a purely 
mathematical argument.  Likewise it involves the assumption that Aristotle’s 
arguments against Zeno were mathematical arguments. In contrast, I suggest that 
both Aristotle and Zeno were arguing about how infinities manifest in the physical 
world.
This problem is particularly noticeable when Hugget discusses Grünbaum’s modern 
solutions to Zeno’s paradoxes. Hugget discusses Grünbaum in relation to an 
argument which Aristotle makes in On Generation and Corruption. The reason why 
Hugget is discussing this argument is because it is considered to have originated 
from Zeno (2010 section 2.3). The arguments is as follows:
Since, therefore, the body is divisible through and through, let it have 
been divided. What, then, will remain? A magnitude? No: that is 
impossible, since then there will be something not divided, whereas ex 
hypothesi the body was divisible through and through. But if it be 
admitted that neither a body nor a magnitude will remain, and yet 
division is to take place, the constituents of the body will either be points 
(i.e. without magnitudes) or absolutely nothing. 
(Aristotle On Generation and Corruption 316a 20-30)
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In summary the argument being made here is that if an extended thing is infinitely 
divisible then one should be able to divide it up completely. The issue is that if an 
extension is completely divided up the resulting bits cannot be extended. If they are 
extended then this means that the division was not complete. Thus the end results of 
these divisions can only be geometric points which have no size or extension in their 
own right. This appears to imply that extended things are composed of non-extended 
things. This, according to Aristotle, does not make sense.
Aristotle uses his concept of a potential infinity to overcome this problem and I will 
discuss how he uses this later. First, however, I will discuss Grünbaum's argument, 
which Hugget is suggesting solves this problem.
Grünbaum describes the problem as being: if a line is a set of points, and points are 
are not extended, then how can the line have a length (Grünbaum 1967 121-125). 
This problem can be seen to be similar to Aristotle’s problem, differing in that 
Grünbaum is using a line as a particular example. Grünbaum’s description of the 
problem is more sophisticated and thorough than I have depicted it here, but this 
fairly accurately summarises the basic problem. It is, more or less, the concern that 
Aristotle had that an extended thing could not be composed of non-extended things 
(316b 5).
Grünbaum’s solution to this issue revolves around the way a set is defined. 
According to Grünbaum, extension is a property of sets rather than of the points 
which lie in the sets. Also, an extension, such as a line, is a set of unit point sets 
rather than a set of points. A unit point set is a set which has one point in it.  
Grünbaum’s argument is that a continuous extension is not “a set of points” but 
rather the “union of unextended unit point sets”(1967 125-126). 
One of the most significant aspects of this definition is that a single “unit point set” is
not extended, but a union of them is extended. Grünbaum gives the following 
analogy. Temperature does not apply to single molecules but does apply to a 
collection of molecules (Grünbaum 1967 125).
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It is not immediately clear, to a novice of set theory such as myself, why a union of 
unit sets can become extended where a set of points cannot. I am speculating that a 
point is being treated like a coordinate position, and a set is being treated like the 
region in which the point is located. Thus the basis for the extension is the region 
which the points occupy, and this is the sense in which a continuous extension is a 
union of unit sets.
Also, for a collection of unit sets to be extended there presumably needs to be an 
infinite amount of them. This is because the points within them will need to be 
densely ordered for the extension to be continuous. Densely ordered, in this 
particular context refers the to a situation where between any two points there are 
always other points (Grünbaum 1967 37-38).
The argument which Grünbaum makes, however, does not necessarily mean that 
Aristotle did not adequately solve this problem of complete divisibility, which 
incidentally is also implied in both the Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes. I suggest 
that the primary argument which Aristotle was making against Zeno was that the 
number of divisions which can be made of an infinitely divisible extension has no 
relation to the size of that extension. Another way of stating this is to say that an 
infinitely divisible extended thing cannot be reduced to the set of divisions which can
be made of it.
I suggest that Aristotle uses the term potential infinity primarily to identify that the 
divisions that are made of continuous extended things are not actual elements of that 
continuous thing but are merely potential things which can come to be as a result of 
dividing that extension. I will more broadly be arguing that Aristotle was only 
interested in how infinities manifested in the world. I will suggest that when Aristotle
denies actualised infinities he is specifically denying that any physical or temporal 
extensions that we encounter could either be infinite in size or completely infinitely 
divided. This does not, however, mean that there are no actual infinite amounts or 
magnitudes, because for a thing to be infinitely divisible there would need to be an 
actual infinity of potential ways of dividing that things up. 
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In terms of the Dichotomy paradox there is an infinite number of potential smaller 
runs which one can identify within the complete run. However the complete run is 
not merely this collection of conceivable smaller runs. Aristotle demonstrates this by 
arguing that if you completely divide an infinitely divisible extension, the results 
would be a collection of non-extended points. Thus Aristotle infers that the divisions 
of an extension, for instance the half runs in the Dichotomy paradox, must only be an
accidental and potential result of the extension rather than what the extension 
actually or essentially is.
To begin with, I re-evaluate Aristotle arguments about infinities. Specifically, I 
discuss the passages of Aristotle’s argument in which he uses the terms potential and 
actual with regard to infinities to see if there are any alternative ways of interpreting 
the terms from those discussed by Hugget and Dowden (and Hankinson (1995) for 
that matter). I suggest that Aristotle is only interested in how infinities manifest in 
physical and temporal extensions. There are two senses in which Aristotle calls 
something infinite: This is firstly with regards to how big an extension is, the second 
sense is with regard to how many times it can be divided (Aristotle Physics 233a20-
30). 
Firstly Aristotle denies that an extension can be infinitely large in his arguments from
206a to 208a (end of book iv). Consider the follow passages: 
What is continuous is divided ad infinitum, but there is no infinite in the 
direction of increase. For the size which it can potentially be, it can also 
actually be. Hence since no sensible magnitude is infinite, it is impossible
to exceed every assigned magnitude; for if it were possible there would 
be something bigger than the heavens.(Aristotle Physics 207b15)
I suggest that Aristotle’s argument at this point is that while extensions are infinitely 
divisible they cannot have an infinite size. The reason that they cannot have an 
infinite size is that this would imply that there is something bigger than the heavens. 
Whether or not the premise that there would be something bigger than the heavens 
leads to the conclusion which Aristotle comes to, is not of concern here.
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I suggest that it is important to note that Aristotle is interested in specifically sensible
magnitudes. I suggest that this indicates that Aristotle was talking about infinities of 
amounts of actual physical or temporal things rather than just numerical values. 
Consider another passage, which I discussed earlier: 
Number on the other hand is a plurality of ‘ones’ and a certain quantity 
of them. Hence number must stop at the indivisible: for ‘two’ and ‘three’ 
are merely derivative terms, and so with each of the other numbers. But 
in the direction of largeness it always possible to think of a larger 
number: for the number of times a magnitude can be bisected is infinite.
(Aristotle Physics 207b5-10)
Again, to the extent that infinity is mentioned, Aristotle is only interested in the way 
that infinity manifests or comes-to-be in the physical world. In this particular case,  
Aristotle derives an infinity from the act of dividing up a continuous extension into 
halves and the halves in to halves again and so forth. Thus I suggest that the term 
“actual” in actual infinity refers to whether or not the individual elements of the 
infinity are actualised in the physical word not to whether there is an actual infinite 
number of them.
The possibility that Aristotle was only interested in how infinities manifest in the 
physical world is overlooked because Aristotle’s discussion of infinities is often 
described in the context of how early set theorists like Cantor struggled to convince 
those around them that mathematicians could work with complete infinite sets23. 
Dauben summarises the kind of arguments which were being made at this time in his 
book Georg Cantor: His Mathematics and Philosophy of the Infinite (1990 122-123).
According to Dauben, the primary concern that opponents of Cantor had was that 
introducing an infinite term into a mathematical equation would annihilate the value 
of the finite mathematical terms in that equation (1990 122-123). For instance if you 
added infinity to the equation 1+2=3 the result would be 1+2+infinity=3+infinity 
23 As I have previously mentioned, both Hugget (2010) and Dowden (2016) discuss Cantor's Set 
theory when they discuss Aristotle’s views on infinity.
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which is equivalent to infinity=infinity. The finite constants 1, 2 and 3 become 
redundant when infinity is introduced. However, this kind of infinity is not what 
would be called an infinite set, instead it is what would be called an infinite 
magnitude. Instead, the kind of infinity which Cantor was interested in was more like
the infinite set of points. An example of an infinite set would be the resulting bits 
which arise from the result of completely dividing an extension which Aristotle 
discusses in On Generation and Corruption (316a-316b).
I am not going to discuss the fundamental arguments which Cantor made about 
infinites, but I do suggest that Cantor was primarily interested in showing that it is 
meaningful to talk about sets of things which contain an infinite number of elements. 
I suggest that Cantor would be of the view that there is an actual or complete infinite 
number of points in a continuous extension. For instance, there is an infinite number 
of points along a continuous line.
I suggest, contrary to the standard interpretation which Hankinson discusses (1995 
140), that Aristotle would agree that there is an infinite number of points in an 
extension. What Aristotle denies is that an extension is that set of points. This can be 
seen in the following passage: 
…a line cannot be composed of points, the line being continuous and the 
point indivisible. (Aristotle Physics 231a25) 
Notice that Aristotle does not deny that there are points in a line. Instead he denies 
that a line is composed of those points. I appreciate that Aristotle does not mention 
the amount of points in the line but the amount of points plays no part in Aristotle’s 
argument as to why a line cannot be composed of points. The reason why this cannot 
be the case is best summed up when Aristotle states that an extended thing cannot be 
composed of non-extended things (On Generation and Corruption 316b 5). I 
appreciate that these two passages come from completely different parts of 
Aristotle’s arguments but I suggest that they are both referring to the same overall 
argument.
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Lets return to the solution which Aristotle gives for the Dichotomy and Achilles 
paradoxes. Consider this passage from Aristotle’s argument:
Therefore to the question whether it is possible to pass through an infinite
number of units either of time or of distance we must reply that in a sense
it is and in a sense it is not. If the units are actual, it is not possible: if 
they are potential, it is possible. (Aristotle Physics 263b1-10)
As I discussed earlier in this paper, Dowden suggests that when Aristotle uses the 
term potential in this argument he is suggesting that the number of smaller runs that 
can ever be considered at any one time will always be finite and thus the size can 
always be determined because there will only ever be a finite number of things to be 
added up (Dowden 2016 section 4). 
An alternative possibility is that Aristotle was suggesting that the infinite set of 
smaller runs (or units) are each potential in nature. What I mean by this is that the 
smaller runs in the Dichotomy are potential things which can come-to-be and pass-
away as a result of the whole continuous motion, but that they are not what that 
motion actually is. I suggest that my interpretation is reflected in this passage from 
Aristotle’s argument:
For in the course of a continuous motion the traveller has traversed an 
infinite number of units in an accidental sense but not in an unqualified 
sense: for though it is an accidental characteristic of the distance to be an 
infinite number of half-distances, this is not its real and essential 
character. (Aristotle Physics 263b5-10)
Another way of putting this argument is to say that the smoothness, or infinite 
divisibility, of a continuous extension is not a result of it being an actual infinite 
collection of infinitely small bits. When we divide an extension we are not simply 
identifying a particular collection of bits within that extension. Instead, a continuous 
extension exhibits an actual infinity of potential divisions. These divisions come-to-
be and pass-away in the extension. However, it is never the case that all of the 
possible ways of dividing the extension would simultaneously come-to-be. This is to 
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say that an extension is never completely divided. If it were to be completely divided
then it would be reduced to a set of non-extended points. But extension cannot be a 
set of non-extended points24.
What I have just posed is one way of interpreting Aristotle’s argument. I have set out
to consider the possibility that modern mathematics is not required to solve the 
problems which Zeno was originally trying to show with the Dichotomy and Achilles
Paradoxes. The reason I have avoided relying on modern methods is that Aristotle is 
likely to have had a better understanding of what Zeno was trying to argue. 
24 And if Grünbaum's argument (1967 125) is any indication, modern mathematicians would 
similarly not claim that an extension can be defined merely as a collection of points. Grünbaum 
argued that the size of an extension was defined by the union of the unit point sets which defined 
the region which the points are distributed through (1967 125-126).
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Chapter Three:
An Interpretation of Zeno which is Obscured by a
Modern Mathematical Approach
I will now consider the question of what Zeno might have been trying to show with 
the Achilles and Dichotomy paradoxes. My interpretation of Zeno is inspired by an 
interpretation that was posed by G.E.L Owen (1957-8) and I will discuss the 
similarities later in the chapter. I will assume that my interpretation of Aristotle is 
correct and that Aristotle does satisfactorily solve the problem that Zeno was trying 
to show. 
I will suggest that Zeno’s concern was that extensions appear to have many parts and
those parts likewise appeared to have many parts. The issue is that if you define an 
extension as simply a collection of the parts within it, then either all extensions 
would be infinitely large because they are composed of an infinite collection of parts 
which have a size, or if the parts have no size then the extensions which are 
composed of them would also have no size. I am suggesting that the primary 
assumption in this argument is that an extension is merely a collection of smaller 
parts. 
I will now briefly summarise my interpretation of Aristotle’s arguments against 
Zeno’s Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes, which I discussed in the previous 
chapter. I will then discuss what one might infer from this interpretation, about 
Zeno’s original arguments.
In his first solution (Physics 233a-233b) Aristotle argued that the size of each of the 
runs, in each respective paradox, would be defined as proportion of the whole run. 
This means that the smaller runs take proportionally less time to complete such that 
the total time taken to complete the runs would be finite. 
In his second argument (Physics 263a-263b10) Aristotle suggests that his initial 
solution was not sufficient because he did not explain how there could be an infinite 
number of smaller runs within the motion: all he argued was that the size of the total 
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run would remain finite no matter how it was divided. I suggested that Aristotle 
argued that continuous extensions, like the runs described in the paradoxes, are never
actually divided. Another way of putting this is to say that an extension is not a 
collection of divisions. Divisions are potential in the sense that they can come-to-be 
and pass-away within the extension but do not represent what the extension is 
composed of.
As for what this might imply about Zeno’s paradox, Aristotle first identifies that 
Zeno is ignoring the concept of proportionality. Zeno does not seem to recognise that
half of a run would take half the time the whole run takes to complete. 
I suggest that Aristotle returns to the paradoxes because he realises that Zeno might 
have been treating the divisions of an extension as actual parts of that extension 
rather than potential parts. Based on the second argument that Aristotle makes 
against Zeno’s Dichotomy and Achilles paradoxes, it appears that Aristotle was of 
the view that Zeno believed that an extension was fundamentally the collection of 
smaller extensions which could be found within it. The problem is that there is no 
identifiable set of extended parts that can define what that extension actually is, or in 
other words, that define that extension's particular size.
I argue that this the idea, that Zeno was assuming that extensions were fundamentally
collections of the smaller extensions which could be found within them, is reflected 
in another one of Zeno's arguments. Specifically, I suggest that this is reflected by an 
argument which is attributed to Zeno by Simplicius:
…if there exists [many things], each thing must have some size and 
solidity, and one part must stand out from the other. And the same 
consideration applies to what projects from this. For it will have size and 
a part will project from it. And it is the same to say this once and always. 
For there will be nothing which can serve as a final part of this nor will 
one part be different from another. Thus if there are many things, they 
must be both small and great: so small as to have no size, so great as to 
be unlimited. (Simplicius Physics 140.34-141.8)
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The argument made here identifies what consequences follow if it is asserted that 
there are many things, specifically if extensions are considered to be pluralities.  I 
will step through each part of this fragment in sequence to explain my interpretation 
of it.
The reasoning behind the claim that each, of the many, must have some “size and 
solidity” is discussed in a different fragment. Simplicius reports that Zeno was 
arguing that if a thing had no size then if it were added to something it would make 
no difference to that thing; furthermore if the thing which it is added to is then 
removed we would be left with nothing (Simplicius Physics 139.5-19 B2). This 
would indicate that Zeno is only interested in plurality with respect to extended 
things or things with a size. An extended thing cannot exist if it does not have a size 
thus it would follow that the many extended things that exist all have a size25.
The part of the passage “ ...and one part must stand out from the other … ” I suggest 
refers to the idea that an extended thing will have distinguishable parts to it which 
exist in their own right. For an example one end of a table is distinct from the other 
end of a table. This line of argument is then followed up by : “… And the same 
consideration applies to what project from this. For it will have size and a part will 
project from it …”.  Consider this again in terms of my table analogy. It has been 
established that the front of the table is distinct from the back, or that they are not the
same thing. Likewise the front and back of the table, themselves each have a distinct 
front and back respectively. 
I suggest that this passage might also indicate that Zeno is treating an extension as a 
collection of smaller extensions. 
The following passage is less clear and more difficult to interpret: “there will be 
nothing which can serve as a final part of this nor will one part be different from 
another”. I suggest that Zeno's argument was that there is no final or ultimate set of 
parts of a thing which a person can find. Also because this property of having an 
25 This is similar to Aristotle’s claim that an extension cannot be composed of non-extended parts 
(On Generation and Corruption 316a). As I mentioned earlier, Hugget points out (2010 section 
2.3) that the arguments which Aristotle makes in this particular section of On Generation and 
Corruption (316a-316b) are considered to have originated from Zeno.
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indefinite number of parts is a property of all extension then to the extent we could 
talk about the ultimate parts of every thing they would all be the same size. This is 
because if we were to consider two parts of different size, the larger part would still 
be further divisible in to more sub parts. Thus I would suggest that Zeno is arguing 
that it is impossible for there to exist an ultimate set of divisions of an extension, 
because there will always be more to make. However to the extent that we could talk 
about an ultimate set of division of an extension, they would all be the same size.
And now the final part of the argument: “Thus if there are many things they must be 
both small and great: so small as to have no size and so great as to be unlimited”. I 
suggest that the argument here is to claim that the units of this plurality of extension 
would be indefinitely small and there would be indefinitely many of them. The “so 
great as to be unlimited” is more normally interpreted to say that the size of any 
given extension is infinite because there are an infinite number of finite extents 
within every extension (Graham 2000 267). 
Overall, I suggest that Zeno had assumed that if there were many parts to an 
extension, then it would follow that an extension was simply a collection of parts. 
The issue is that all extensions, including the parts of extension, have parts. Thus an 
extension could not be a plurality of smaller extensions because there was no 
ultimate, or smallest set, of extended parts. I have inferred this from the fact that I 
have interpreted Aristotle’s primary criticism of Zeno as being that an extension is 
not fundamentally the collection of the divisions which can be made of that 
extension.
This is a very similar, if not the same, kind of interpretation as that which 
G.E.L. Owen made of Zeno’s paradoxes in his article Zeno and the Mathematicians 
(1957-8). Owen had suggested that Zeno’s argument was that it was impossible to 
locate the units of a plurality (1957-8). For example in the Dichotomy paradox the 
runner sets out to run some distance but before they can traverse that distance they 
will need to traverse some part of that distance. However it is impossible to identify 
the first distance which needs to be travelled because for any distance considered 
there will always be another smaller distance which precedes it. The run therefore 
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cannot be a plurality of smaller runs because it is impossible to determine what the 
individual units of that plurality would be.
Of course, there is a plurality of shorter runs in any given finite run in the same sense
that “1= ¼ +¼ +¼ +¼”. However the run itself is not actually a plurality of some set 
of shorter runs within it. This is because any particular one of the shorter runs, within
the larger run, is also a plurality of shorter runs, and, by virtue of this, cannot be 
treated as a constituent part of the run. This is because an extended thing cannot be 
composed of pluralities which are themselves composed of pluralities ad infinitum. If
this were the case and that extended thing was reduced to its completely divided 
form, it would be reduced to the infinite set of non-extended point positions which lie
within the extension. By themselves, these points are not what the extension actually 
is. This is because an extension cannot be composed of non-extended things.
What I have discussed so far in this chapter is just an example of how one could go 
about using Aristotle’s arguments against Zeno, independent of modern 
mathematical arguments and concepts, to construct an interpretation of Zeno. 
41
Conclusion
What I hope to have shown in this dissertation is that comparing Zeno’s paradoxes, 
and Aristotle’s solutions to them, to modern solutions is not helpful for those trying 
to determine Zeno’s original purpose. Firstly, because we are not completely sure of 
what Zeno was originally trying to argue,  to the extent we discuss the paradoxes, I 
would suggest that we should refrain from trying to solve them. Instead we should 
primarily stick to trying to infer what he was arguing from the solutions given by 
other ancient philosophers. This is because what little we have of Zeno’s arguments 
does not provide enough for one to be certain what he was trying to argue with the 
paradoxes.
Secondly, introducing modern solutions into the discussion of Zeno encourages 
people to treat Zeno’s works as if they are directly aimed at modern mathematics. 
For instance, the size of each successive run in the Dichotomy paradox can be 
represented by a particular infinite series. This particular infinite series happens to 
sum to a finite magnitude. However, if the paradox is explained in these terms, then 
the physical aspect of the circumstance which Zeno discusses becomes irrelevant and
the problem simply becomes one of adding up abstract magnitudes. I hope to have 
shown in the first chapter that Aristotle appears to first consider the Dichotomy and 
Achilles paradoxes in a similar way but then later decides that he might have missed 
Zeno’s point. Aristotle initially argued that no matter how many times you divide an 
extension, because the size of each division is defined as a proportion of the whole, 
the sum of the size of all of those divisions would always equal the original size of 
the whole. While Aristotle does not use the idea of infinite summation, his initial 
solution is about the more abstract concept of proportionality and specifically that 
Zeno appears to be ignoring that concept.
The fact that Aristotle returns to the problem, claims that his initial solution was not 
sufficient, and then proceeds to argue that an extension is not actually divided or is 
not composed of actual divisions, would indicate that he believed that Zeno might 
have been making an argument about physical and temporal extension.
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From this I suggest that to the extent that Zeno talked about addition of magnitudes, 
he would have been referring to the act of summing up extended things. I suggest 
that Zeno’s main concern is that because physical and temporal extensions appear to 
be infinitely divisible, it is hard to see what the parts of these extensions could be. 
This involves the assumption that an extension is a collection of smaller extensions 
and that the size of an extension arises when the size of all of its parts are summed 
up. If this is the case then several problems appear to follow. Firstly, the smallest 
parts cannot be extended, because this would imply that there are smaller parts yet to 
be identified. An extension cannot be a collection of non-extended things. Even if it 
is allowed that the smallest parts have a size, there would be an infinite number of 
them. This would mean that the size of any given extension would be infinite 
because it is a collection of infinitely many extended bits.
I have inferred this interpretation of Zeno from my interpretation of Aristotle’s 
solution. Specifically I argue that Aristotle had set out to show that an extension is 
neither the set of divisions which can be made of it, nor the set of points which can 
be found within it. I argue that Aristotle is of the view that the divisions which can be
made of a continuous extension and the points at which those divisions are made do 
not represent what the extension actually is. Instead the divisions and points are 
things which can potentially be by virtue of there being a continuous extension. For 
instance a division can only exist as a division of an extension and a point can only 
exist as a position within an extension. In Aristotle’s terminology there is an infinity 
of potential divisions which can be made of a continuous extension. More generally I
argue that Aristotle is of the view that there cannot be infinities of actual things or 
actual things which are infinitely large.
This interpretation differs from the standard interpretation of Aristotle’s solution. 
Usually Aristotle is seen to have denied that there are complete infinities. When 
Aristotle uses the term potential to describe an infinity it is more usually seen as 
indicating that an infinity is something which is finite but can always be added to, 
increased, or alternatively further sub divided. This is not an unreasonable 
interpretation, given that Aristotle also suggests that mathematicians have no need 
for complete or actual infinite sets. 
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The reason why I suggest my alternative interpretation is because on the occasions 
where Aristotle talks about infinites he discusses them in terms of physical or 
temporal things. Again my argument is that what Aristotle denies is that an extension
is an infinite number of actual parts and also that there can be actual extensions of 
infinite size.
When Hugget and Dowden discuss Aristotle’s solutions to Zeno’s paradoxes they 
insist on pointing out that modern mathematicians would not use the idea of 
potentiality when discussing infinities. When they discuss this they are assuming the 
more standard interpretation of Aristotle where he is assumed to be arguing that a 
potential infinity is a finite set which can always be added to. Hugget and Dowden 
would have no reason to consider my interpretation given that they appear to be 
discussing Zeno and Aristotle primarily in mathematical terms and modern 
mathematics has a particular way of imagining infinitely small divisions. My 
suggestion that Aristotle was of the view that the elements of an infinity must always
be potential in nature is not relevant to mathematics. My suggestion would indicate 
that Aristotle was posing a physics argument rather than a mathematical argument. 
My argument is that Aristotle was not arguing about numbers or amounts, but about 
the constitution of extended things.
Thus if it is possible that Aristotle’s argument against Zeno was an argument about 
the constitution of extension, then it is also possible that Zeno was originally trying 
to pose an argument about the constitution of extension. If I am right in my assertion 
that Aristotle was claiming that an extension is not a collection of smaller extensions,
then it is possible that Zeno had assumed that an extension was a collection of 
smaller extensions. 
The possibility of interpreting Zeno and Aristotle in this way is obscured by the ways
scholars like Hugget and Dowden insist on comparing Zeno and Aristotle’s 
arguments to modern mathematical arguments. This is not to say that the modern 
mathematical arguments, which are based on, or inspired by, Zeno’s paradoxes, 
should not be discussed. Rather, these discussions should be clearly separated from 
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